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I. Introduction 
Recently some results have been presented which show that certain kinds of de-
terministic descriptions and indeterministic descriptions are observationally 
equivalent (Werndl 2009a, Werndl 2011). These results prompt interesting phi-
losophical questions, such as what exactly they show or whether the deterministic 
or indeterministic description is preferable. There is hardly any philosophical dis-
cussion about these questions, and this paper contributes to filling this gap. 
 
More specifically, first, I discuss the philosophical comments made by mathemati-
cians about observational equivalence, in particular Ornstein and Weiss (1991). 
Their comments are vague, and I argue that, according to a reasonable interpreta-
tion, they are misguided. Second, the results on observational equivalence raise 
the question of whether the deterministic or indeterministic description is prefer-
able relative to evidence. If none of them is preferable, there is underdetermina-
tion. I criticise Winnie’s (1998) argument that, by appealing to different observa-
tions, one finds that the deterministic description is preferable. In particular, I 
clarify a confusion in this argument. Furthermore, I argue that if the concern is a 
strong form of underdetermination, the argument delivers the desired conclusion 
but this conclusion follows from a much simpler argument; and for other kinds of 
underdetermination the argument fails. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces deterministic and indetermin-
istic descriptions. Section 2 presents the relevant results on observational equiva-
lence. These results are technical, and I will keep the discussion at an intuitive 
level. Section 3 discusses the mathematicians' claims about observational equiva-
lence. Section 4 is about Winnie's argument on the role of different observations. 
Section 5 summarises the results. 
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II. Deterministic and Indeterministic Descriptions 
I now introduce the relevant deterministic and indeterministic descriptions infor-
mally; for the technical details see Werndl (2011). There are two kinds of descrip-
tions: either the time-parameter varies discretely or continually. Because the latter 
case is more important in the sciences, this paper focuses on descriptions involv-
ing a continuous time parameter. 1 
II.a Deterministic Descriptions 
We are concerned with measure-theoretic deterministic descriptions, in short de-
terministic descriptions. A deterministic description is a triple (X,Tt,p); the set X 
(the phase space), represents all possible states; Tt(x), t∈R, are functions (the evo-
lution functions) which tell one that the system in state x evolves to Tt(x) after t 
time steps; and p assigns a probability to regions of X.2 Clearly, these descriptions 
are deterministic according to the standard definition, namely that determinism 
means that two solutions which agree at one time agree at all future times. A solu-
tion represents a possible evolution of the system in the course of time. It is a 
function sx(t):RX; sx(t):=Tt(x) for an arbitrary x∈X. Deterministic descriptions 
thus defined are among the most important descriptions in science, e.g., they in-
clude all deterministic descriptions in Newtonian mechanics. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Two hard balls in a box 
 
 
Example 1. Two hard balls in a box. This system consists of two balls moving in a 
three-dimensional box; the balls interact by elastic collisions and have a finite ra-
dius but no rotational motion (cf. Simanyi 1999). Figure 1 shows the hard ball sys-
tem in a specific state. Mathematically, this system is described by a Newtonian 
description as follows. X is the set of all possible states, i.e., the set of all vectors 
consisting of the position and velocity coordinates of the two balls. Thus the spe-
cific state of the system shown in Figure 1 is represented by exactly one x∈X. The 
evolution functions tell us that the hard ball system in state x evolves to Tt(x) after 
t time steps. For an arbitrary region A in phase space, p assigns the probability 
p(A) to the event that the two hard balls are in one of the states represented by A. 
                                                          
1
 For discrete-time descriptions, see Werndl (2009a). 
2
 There are various interpretations of this probability measure. For instance, ac-
cording to the time-average interpretation, the probability of A is the long-run av-
erage of the fraction of time a solution spends in A (Werndl 2009b). 
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And a solution represents a possible evolution of the hard ball system in the course 
of time. 
 
Finally, when a deterministic system in state x is observed, a value Φ(x) is ob-
served which is dependent on x (but may be different from it). Thus observations 
are modeled as observation functions, i.e., functions Φ:XXO where XO represents 
the set of possible observed values. 
II.b Stochastic Processes 
The indeterministic descriptions which concern us are stochastic descriptions, 
which model processes governed by probabilistic laws. A stochastic description 
{Zt} consists of a family of functions Zt:ΩE, t∈R. The set E, called the outcome 
space, represents all possible outcomes, and Zt(ω) represents the outcome of the 
process at time t. Furthermore, probability distributions P(Zt∈A) tells us the prob-
ability that the process is in A at time t for any region A of E and any t∈R, and 
probability distributions P(Zs∈A given that Zt∈B) tell us the probability that the 
process is in A at time s given that it is in B at time t for arbitrary regions A,B of E 
and any t,s∈R. A realisation represents a possible evolution of the process in the 
course of time; it is a function rω(t):RE, rω(t):=Zt(ω) for an arbitrary ω∈Ω. 
(Here one sees that, intuitively, ω encodes the evolution of the stochastic process.) 
Stochastic descriptions are usually indeterministic. If the description takes a spe-
cific outcome, there are many outcomes that might follow, and a probability dis-
tribution measures the likelihood of them. Stochastic descriptions are ubiquitous 
in the sciences. 
 
Figure 2.2 A realisation of a semi-Markov description 
 
Example 2: semi-Markov descriptions. A semi-Markov description has finitely 
many possible outcomes e1,…,en. The description takes the outcome ei for a time 
ui, and which outcome follows ei depends only on ei. Figure 2 shows a realisation 
of a semi-Markov description with four possible outcomes e1,e2,e3,e4. The prob-
ability distributions of the semi-Markov description tell us, for instance, the prob-
ability that the description takes a specific outcome at time t, such as P(Zt=e3), or 
the probability that an outcome at t is followed by another outcome at s, e.g., 
P(Zs=e3 given that Zt=e4) for t,s∈R (Ornstein and Weiss 1991, Werndl 2011). 
Semi-Markov descriptions are widespread in the sciences (cf. Janssen 1991). 
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III. Observational Equivalence of Deterministic and Indeterministic 
Descriptions 
Observational equivalence as understood here means that the deterministic de-
scription, when the respective system is observed, and the stochastic description 
give the same predictions. Let me explain what “give the same predictions” 
means. The predictions derived from a stochastic description are the probability 
distributions over its realisations. Because there is a probability measure p defined 
on a deterministic description, when applying an observation function, the predic-
tions obtained are the probability distributions over the solutions of the description 
coarse-grained by the observation function. Consequently, a stochastic description 
Zt and a deterministic description (X,Tt,p) observed with an observation function 
Φ give the same predictions iff: (i) the outcome space E of Zt and the set of possi-
ble values of Φ are identical, and (ii) the probability distributions over the solu-
tions of the deterministic description coarse-grained by Φ and the probability dis-
tributions over the realisations are the same. 
 
Suppose that an observation function Φ is applied to a deterministic description 
(X,Tt,p). Then {Φ(Tt)} is a stochastic description which is observationally equiva-
lent to (X,Tt,p) relative to Φ. Let me explain this with an example. Consider the 
description of two hard balls in a box (Example 1) and an observation function of 
this description with four possible values e1,e2,e3,e4. Because a probability meas-
ure p is defined on the phase space X, one obtains probabilities such as 
P(Φ(Tt)=e1) and P(Φ(Ts)=e2 given that Φ(Tt)=e4) for all t,s∈R. Now {Φ(Tt)} is 
exactly the stochastic description with outcomes e1,e2,e3,e4 and the probability dis-
tributions are determined by applying Φ to the hard ball description. Hence the 
outcome space of {Φ(Tt)} and the set of possible observed values obtained by ap-
plying Φ to the hard-ball description are identical; and the realisations of {Φ(Tt)} 
and the solutions of the hard ball description coarse-grained by Φ have the same 
probability distributions. Thus {Φ(Tt)} and the hard ball description relative to Φ 
are observationally equivalent. 
 
The question arises whether the stochastic description {Φ(Tt)} is nontrivial. To 
highlight the issue: if Φ is the identity function, {Φ(Tt)}={Tt}; hence this stochas-
tic description has only trivial probabilities (0 and 1) and is really the original de-
terministic description. It turns out that {Φ(Tt)} is often nontrivial. Let me state a 
result of Werndl (2011). 
 
Theorem 1. If for the deterministic description (X,Tt,p) there does not exist an 
n∈R+ and a C⊆X, 0<p(C)<1, such that Tn(C)=C, then for any arbitrary nontrivial 
finite-valued observation function Φ, {Zt}={Φ(Tt)} is nontrivial in the following 
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sense: for all t∈R, for all k∈R+ there are ei,ej∈E such that 0<P(Zt+k=ei given that 
Zt=ej)<1.  
 
This result is strong: one obtains nontrivial stochastic descriptions regardless of 
which finite-valued observation function is applied. Theorem 1 applies to several 
descriptions in science, e.g., to hard ball descriptions which are important in statis-
tical mechanics; in particular, to descriptions of two hard balls in a box (Example 
1) and to almost all descriptions of a finite number of hard balls moving on a torus 
(Simanyi 1991, Simanyi 2003); to geodesic flows of negative curvature, i.e., fric-
tionless motion of a particle moving with unit speed on a compact manifold with 
everywhere negative curvature (Ornstein and Weiss 1991); to many billiard de-
scriptions (Chernov 2006); and also to dissipative descriptions such as the Lorenz 
system which models weather dynamics (Luzzatto 2005). 
 
The discussion so far was about how, given deterministic descriptions, one finds 
observationally equivalent stochastic descriptions. There are also results about 
how, given stochastic descriptions, one finds observationally equivalent determi-
nistic descriptions. First, given any stochastic description, one can construct a de-
terministic description, called the deterministic representation, such that the fol-
lowing holds: the deterministic representation, relative to a specific observation 
function Φ0, is observationally equivalent to the stochastic description. Yet the 
phase space of the deterministic representation is defined as consisting of all pos-
sible realisations of the stochastic description and thus this construction involves a 
cheat (Werndl 2011).  Apart from the deterministic representation, there are re-
sults which show how, given certain kinds of stochastic descriptions, one finds ob-
servationally equivalent deterministic descriptions. Let me present two results in 
this direction. 
 
Theorem 1 tells us that deterministic descriptions in science and stochastic de-
scriptions can be observationally equivalent. Yet it is silent about the nature of 
these stochastic descriptions. So one might wonder whether deterministic descrip-
tions in science can be observationally equivalent to stochastic descriptions in sci-
ence (descriptions in science are those that are derived with help of scientific theo-
ries). The following theorem shows that the answer is affirmative. 
 
Theorem 2. If the deterministic description (X,Tt,p) is a continuous Bernoulli sys-
tem, then there are observation functions Φ such that {Φ(Tt)} is a semi-Markov 
description (Ornstein 1970a). 
 
Several deterministic descriptions in science are continuous Bernoulli systems 
(e.g., all descriptions listed after Theorem 1). Hence several deterministic descrip-
tions in science yield stochastic descriptions in science (semi-Markov descriptions 
(Example 2)). 
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One can go further and ask: can deterministic descriptions in science only yield 
stochastic descriptions in science for specific observation functions? Or can de-
terministic descriptions in science yield stochastic descriptions in science regard-
less at which observation level they are observed? The latter is true. 
 
Theorem 3. If the deterministic description (X,Tt,p) is a continuous Bernoulli sys-
tem, then for every α>0, (X,Tt,p) is α-congruent to a semi-Markov description 
(Ornstein and Weiss 1991). 
 
Intuitively speaking, being α-congruent means to be observationally equivalent at 
observation level α (cf. Werndl 2011). Several deterministic descriptions in sci-
ence are continuous Bernoulli systems. Thus Theorem 3 shows that several deter-
ministic descriptions in science are observationally equivalent at every observa-
tion level to stochastic descriptions in science (namely semi-Markov descriptions 
(Example 2)). 
 
Let me now turn to the mathematicians' comments on the results on observational 
equivalence. 
IV. Mathematicians' Comments on Observational Equivalence 
There are hardly any mathematicians commenting on the philosophical signifi-
cance of the results on observational equivalence. The main exception is the fol-
lowing: 
Our theorem [Theorem 3] also tells us that certain semi-Markov systems could be thought 
of as being produced by Newton's laws (billiards seen through a deterministic viewer) or 
by coin-flipping. This may mean that there is no philosophical distinction between 
processes governed by roulette wheels and processes governed by Newton's laws. {The 
popular literature emphasises the distinction between “deterministic chaos” and “real 
randomness”.} In this connection we should note that our model for a stationary process 
(§1.2) [the deterministic representation] means that random processes have a deterministic 
model. This model, however, is abstract, and there is no reason to believe that it can be 
endowed with any special additional structure. Our point is that we are comparing, in a 
strong sense, Newton's laws and coin flipping.3 (Ornstein and Weiss1991, 39–40) 
Let me first focus on the claim that there may be no “philosophical distinction be-
tween processes governed by roulette wheels and processes governed by Newton's 
laws”. The most direct reading is that there may be no conceptual distinction be-
tween deterministic and stochastic descriptions. This seems wrong. This concep-
tual distinction will always remain, regardless of any results on observational 
equivalence.  
                                                          
3
 The text in braces is in a footnote. 
7 
 
In the above quote Ornstein and Weiss also comment on the meaning of Theorem 
3. On the most plausible reading, they claim that it expresses that deterministic de-
scriptions in science, relative to some observation functions (“viewers”), can be 
observationally equivalent to stochastic descriptions in science (semi-Markov de-
scriptions). This also illuminates why Ornstein and Weiss mention the determinis-
tic representation, namely, to highlight that this is a case of observational equiva-
lence different from the deterministic representation, which is not a system is 
science. However, this claim is puzzling. As discussed in the previous section, al-
ready Theorem 2 shows that deterministic descriptions in science can be observa-
tionally equivalent to semi-Markov descriptions; and Theorem 2 was known be-
fore Theorem 3 was proven and is weaker than Theorem 3. Still, this is the most 
plausible reading. In the previous section I argued that Theorem 3 shows that de-
terministic descriptions in science are observationally equivalent at every observa-
tion level to stochastic descriptions in science. So one expected Ornstein and 
Weiss to claim this. But this seems not the case because, first, they do not refer to 
all possible observation levels, and second, if they claimed this, there would be no 
reason to mention the deterministic representation (cf. Werndl 2011). 
 
Suppes (1993, 254) claims that Ornstein and Weiss prove the following (referring 
to Theorem 3): “There are processes which can equally well be analysed as deter-
ministic systems of classical mechanics or as indeterministic semi-Markov proc-
esses, no matter how many observations are made.” Clearly, Theorem 3 only 
proves some results about observational equivalence and not that processes can be 
equally well analysed as deterministic or indeterministic descriptions. It is not 
clear that the latter follows from the former. Indeed, I argue in the next section 
that the results on observational equivalence do not imply that the phenomena can 
be equally well analysed as deterministic or indeterministic. 
 
Winnie (1998, 310) seems to be the only philosopher who explicitly discusses the 
above quote by Ornstein and Weiss. He takes the claim that there may be no “phi-
losophical distinction between processes governed by roulette wheels and proc-
esses governed by Newton's laws” to mean what Suppes (1993) claims, namely 
the following: the phenomena can be equally well analysed as deterministic or in-
deterministic descriptions. It is not clear that the absence of the philosophical dis-
tinction amounts to the same as that the phenomena can be equally well analysed 
as deterministic or stochastic; so it is unclear whether Ornstein and Weiss (1991) 
really want to say this. But if they do, as just mentioned, I will argue in the next 
section that this is not the case. 
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V. Winnie on the Role of Different Observations 
V.a Choice and Underdetermination 
We have seen that, in certain cases, deterministic and stochastic descriptions are 
observationally equivalent. Then there is a choice between a deterministic descrip-
tion and a stochastic description obtained by applying an observation function Φ 
to the deterministic description, and the question arises of which description is 
preferable. I assume that the deterministic and the stochastic description are about 
the same level of reality, e.g., they both describe the motion of two hard balls.4 
And I focus on the question of which description is preferable relative to evidence. 
If none is preferable, there is underdetermination. 
 
It is important to note that there is no underdetermination between a deterministic 
description and a stochastic description obtained by applying Φ to a deterministic 
description relative to all in principle possible observations which show whether 
there are more states than the ones given by the observation function Φ. In this 
case only one of the descriptions agrees with the possible observations. This can 
be seen as follows: suppose that in principle possible observations show that there 
are more states than the ones given by Φ. Then the stochastic description cannot 
agree with the observations because it has only the states given by Φ. Conversely, 
suppose that in principle possible observations show that there are no other states 
than the ones given by Φ. Then the deterministic description is ruled out because 
it has more states than the ones given by Φ. 
 
However, other kinds of underdetermination are possible, namely all kinds of un-
derdetermination which are relative to observations which do not show whether 
there are more states than the ones given by Φ. In particular, suppose that an ob-
servation function Φ is given and that current technology does not allow one to 
find out whether there are more states then the ones given by Φ (from the deter-
ministic perspective this means that Φ is, or is finer than, the finest possible ob-
servation function). This implies that the predictions of the deterministic descrip-
tion and of the stochastic description (resulting from applying Φ) agree at all 
currently possible observation levels. If the possible evidence does not favour a 
description, there is underdetermination relative to all currently possible observa-
                                                          
4
 If the descriptions are about different levels of reality, the situation seems dif-
ferent. For instance, in certain cases one might argue that at one level of reality the 
deterministic description, and at another level of reality the stochastic description 
is preferable. 
9 
tions (cf. Laudan and Leplin 1991). I take it that Suppes' (1993) claim that phe-
nomena are equally well analysable by deterministic or stochastic descriptions im-
plies that there is underdetermination. 
 
In what follows I concentrate on an argument against underdetermination by Win-
nie (1998). I will criticize this argument and, in particular, I will clarify a confu-
sion in it. 
V.b Trivial Transition Probabilities to Coarser Observations 
Winnie (1998) starts with the following thought. For a deterministic description 
(X,Tt,p) consider observation functions Ψ and Φ such that Φ is coarser than Ψ, 
i.e., there is at least one value of Φ such that two or more values of Ψ correspond 
to one value of Φ, and a value of Φ always corresponds to one or more values of 
Ψ. Even if {Φ(Tt)} and {Ψ(Tt)} are nontrivial stochastic descriptions, the follow-
ing can hold for a time period t: for every value oΨ of Ψ and every value oΦ of  Φ 
the probability that oΨ will lead to oΦ after t time steps is 0 or 1. Thus there are 
trivial transition probabilities from the observation modeled by Ψ to the coarser 
observation modeled by Φ, where the transition probabilities are the probabilities 
that any arbitrary value follows another arbitrary value.5 Winnie (1998, 314–315) 
comments on this: 
Thus, the fact that a chaotic deterministic system [...] has some partitioning that yields a 
set of random or stochastic observations in no way undermines the distinction between 
deterministic and stochastic behaviour for such systems. [...] As successive partitionings 
are exemplified [...] the determinism underlying the preceding, coarser observations 
emerges. To be sure, at any state of the above process, the system may be modeled 
stochastically, but the successive stages of that modeling process provide ample – 
inductive – reason for believing that the deterministic model is correct [original 
emphasis]. 
                                                          
5
 To give an example, on X=[0,1]x[0,1] consider:  
T((x,y))=(2x,y\2) if 0≤x<1\2, (2x–1,(y+1)/2) if 1\2≤x≤1. 
For the Lebesgue probability measure p one obtains the discrete-time deterministic 
description (X,Tt,p), called the baker's transformation. Consider 
Φ((x,y))=o1χα1((x,y))+o2χα2((x,y)), where α1=[0,1]x[0,1/2], α2=[0,1]x(1/2,1] and 
Ψ((x,y))=q1χβ1((x,y))+q2χβ2((x,y))+q3χβ3((x,y))+q4χβ4((x,y)), where 
β1=[0,1/2]x[0,1/2], β2=(1/2,1]x[0,1/2], β3=[0,1/2]x(1/2,1], β4=(1/2,1]x(1/2,1] 
(χA(z):=1 for z∈A; 0 otherwise). Clearly, if one observes q1 (with Ψ), the probabil-
ity that one next observes o1 (with Φ) is 1; if one observes q2, the probability that 
one next observes o2 is 1; if one observes q3, the probability that one next observes 
o1 is 1; and if one observes q4, the probability that one next observes o2 is 1.  
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In order to understand this quote, note the following. From the fact that there are 
trivial transition probabilities from an observation (Ψ) to a coarser observation (Φ) 
after t time steps, it does not follow that the observed phenomenon is deterministic 
and Winnie also does not claim this. It may be that {Ψ(Tt)}, or any stochastic de-
scription at a smaller scale, is the correct description. 
 
The argument Winnie (1998) seems to make is the following. Relative to the no-
tion of underdetermination of interest, consider the observation functions which, 
according to the deterministic description, one should be able to apply (i.e., corre-
sponding to observations which, according to the deterministic description, are in 
principle possible or possible given current technology). Suppose that the observa-
tions corresponding to these observation functions can be made (i.e. are in princi-
ple possible or possible given current technology).  Suppose that for some obser-
vation functions there are trivial transition probabilities from finer to coarser 
observation functions after t time steps for some fixed time t. Now consider all ob-
servation functions such that there are trivial transition probabilities from finer to 
coarser observation functions, and suppose that one finds that the application of 
finer observation functions leads to stochastic descriptions at a smaller scale (i.e., 
descriptions where there is at least one outcome of the stochastic description at a 
larger scale such that two or more outcomes of the stochastic description at a 
smaller scale correspond to one outcome of the description at a larger scale; and 
an outcome of the description at a larger scale always corresponds to one or more 
outcomes of the description at a smaller scale). Then the deterministic description 
is preferable relative to evidence. 
 
My first criticism is that it is unclear why this argument requires that there are 
trivial transition probabilities from finer to coarser observation functions. The 
force of the argument seems only that finer observations can be made, that for 
finer observation functions one obtains stochastic descriptions at a smaller scale, 
and that the stochastic descriptions at a smaller scale explain how the probabilities 
of the stochastic description at the larger scale arise. Simple examples show that 
there are observation functions such that finer observation functions yield stochas-
tic descriptions at a smaller scale, but the transition probabilities are not always (or 
even never) trivial.6 The force of the argument also seems to apply to these exam-
ples. From the text it is not entirely clear whether Winnie thought that trivial tran-
sition probabilities to coarser observations are decisive for the argument that the 
deterministic description is preferable. If yes, as just argued, this is puzzling be-
                                                          
6
 For example, consider the baker's transformation (X,Tt,p). Let 
Ψ((x,y))=q1χβ1((x,y))+q2χβ2((x,y))+q3χβ3((x,y))+q4χβ4((x,y)) be as in the previous 
footnote and let Φ((x,y))=o1χγ1((x,y))+o2χγ2((x,y)), γ1=[0,1/2]x[0,1], 
γ2=(1/2,1]x[0,1]. Clearly, for all i, 1≤i≤4, and all j, 1≤j≤2, the probability that qi is 
followed by oj 1/2. Still Φ is coarser than Ψ, and for the observation Ψ at the finer 
level one obtains a stochastic description at a smaller scale.  
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cause the force of the argument does not seem to hinge on this. If not, it is confus-
ing that trivial transition probabilities to coarser observations are highlighted in 
the way they are. 
 
I will now criticize Winnie's argument; my criticism applies regardless of whether 
one requires that the observation functions are such that trivial transition prob-
abilities are observed from finer to coarser observations. 
V.c Criticism of Winnie's Argument About Finer Stochastic 
Processes 
Winnie does not state which kind of underdetermination he is concerned with. 
Suppose that it is underdetermination relative to in principle possible observations 
which show whether there are more states than the ones given by Φ. As argued at 
the beginning of this section, here it is easy to see that there is no underdetermina-
tion. Then Winnie's argument indeed delivers the correct conclusion: the determi-
nistic description is preferable just in case there are more states than the ones 
given by Φ. And there are more states than the ones given by Φ just in case the in 
principle possible observations (according to the deterministic description) can be 
made; and then it automatically follows that finer observation functions lead to 
stochastic descriptions at a smaller scale. Still, Winnie's argument seems compli-
cated. The reason why there is no underdetermination is simply that only the de-
terministic description agrees with the in principle possible observations. 
 
Suppose that Winnie is concerned with underdetermination relative to all possible 
observations given current technology. Then, I will argue, Winnie's argument 
fails. To show this, it suffices to present a scenario that could happen in science 
(regardless of whether this is actually the case) where the premises are true but the 
conclusion is not. Let me outline such a scenario. 
 
This scenario appeals to indirect evidence, which is generally regarded as an im-
portant kind of evidence (Laudan 1996, Laudan and Leplin 1991, Okasha 2002). 
Let me given an example of indirect evidence (cf. Laudan 1996). Darwin's hy-
pothesis of natural selection is only about selection which is natural and not artifi-
cial. Despite this, data from breeders about artificial selection provide evidence for 
Darwin's theory about natural selection. Data from breeders support Darwin's gen-
eral theory of evolution and so provide indirect evidence for the theory of natural 
selection (even though these data are not derivable from the theory of natural se-
lection). As Laudan and Leplin (1991) point out, indirect evidence can be an ar-
gument against underdetermination. Suppose that the same predictions are deriv-
able from a hypothesis H than from the theory of natural selection but that H is not 
derivable from Darwin's general theory of evolution. Because of the indirect evi-
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dence for the theory of natural selection, it is preferable to H relative to evidence, 
and there is no underdetermination. 
 
An analogous argument for our concern – descriptions and not hypotheses – can 
easily be found. Suppose that the stochastic description S which arises from apply-
ing Φ to the deterministic description derives from a well-confirmed theory W and 
the deterministic description D does not derive from any theory. Furthermore, 
suppose that current technology does not allow one to find out whether there are 
more states than the ones given by Φ. This means that regardless of whether the 
stochastic or deterministic description is correct, one can make the observations 
corresponding to the observation functions one is interested in. Furthermore, for 
the observation functions which one can apply (and where, maybe, only those pos-
sible observation functions are considered where there are trivial transition prob-
abilities from finer to coarser observations) the following holds: for finer observa-
tion functions one obtains stochastic descriptions at a smaller scale. Hence the 
premises of Winnie's argument are true. Now even though S and D are observa-
tionally equivalent, there are many descriptions which are not derivable from S or 
D but which support W. Suppose that some of these descriptions provide indirect 
evidence for S. Then the stochastic description S is preferable relative to evidence, 
and the conclusion of Winnie's argument is not true. Also, there is no underdeter-
mination; consequently, Suppes' (1993) claim that the phenomena are equally well 
analysable as deterministic or stochastic descriptions fails. 
 
What does indirect evidence amount to? Note that being derivable from the same 
hypothesis or statement cannot be sufficient for indirect evidence because this 
would lead to the paradox that any statement confirms any statement.7 A promis-
ing account is that there is indirect confirmation when two statements are strongly 
coherent because of a unifying theory; in our examples this coherence is provided 
by Darwin’s general theory about evolution, by Newtonian theory and by the the-
ory W. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper started by presenting some results on the observational equivalence of 
deterministic and indeterministic descriptions. Then I examined philosophical 
questions prompted by these results. 
 
                                                          
7
 Statement A confirms itself; A is derivable from A&B (B is any statement); B 
is derivable from A&B. Hence, A confirms B.   
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First, I discussed the philosophical comments made by mathematicians about ob-
servational equivalence, namely Ornstein and Weiss (1991), and I argued that they 
are misguided. For instance, on a direct reading, Ornstein and Weiss claim that the 
results on observational equivalence may show that there is no conceptual distinc-
tion between deterministic and indeterministic descriptions. However, regardless 
of any results on observational equivalence, this distinction remains. 
 
Second, if there is a choice between a deterministic and an indeterministic descrip-
tion, the question arises of which description is preferable. I investigated Winnie’s 
(1998) argument that the deterministic description is preferable which goes as fol-
lows. Consider the possible observation functions which, according to the deter-
ministic description, one should be able to apply. Suppose that these observations 
can be made and that there are trivial transition probabilities from finer to coarser 
observations after t time steps. Further, suppose that stochastic descriptions at a 
smaller scale are obtained when finer observation functions are applied. Then the 
deterministic description is preferable relative to all evidence. I clarified a confu-
sion in this argument: it unclear why trivial transition probabilities are required 
from finer to coarser observations because the force of the argument does not 
seem to hinge on this. Then I argued that, regardless of this, if the concern is a 
strong form of underdetermination, the argument delivers the desired conclusion 
but this conclusion follows from a much simpler argument. And if the concern is 
underdetermination relative to the possible observations given current technology, 
the argument fails. The question of whether the deterministic or the stochastic de-
scription is preferable is an interesting one and, as my discussion has hopefully 
shown, it deserves further investigation. 
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